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Abstract 
Financial credit policy support is urgent for elimination of backward production capacity and promotion of energy 
saving and emission reduction. This paper analyzes enterprises’ behavioral choice between high emission and low 
emission, constructs credit departments’ and enterprises’ utility functions, discusses how behavior variations 
influence their utilities from non-cooperative and cooperative perspective. It shows that in order to reduce the 
probability of high emission, prevent backward production capacity resurgence, and implement credit policy about 
energy saving and emission reduction smoothly, we should not only increase the whitewashing cost of high emission 
enterprises, prohibit conspiracy between credit departments and enterprises, but also strengthen related departments’ 
information exchange and sharing, enlarge low emission enterprises’ reputation, thus form combinations of several 
policies and reinforce policy efforts in the end. 
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1. Introduction 
Although there is no obligation to assume binding emission reduction targets, China has promised that 
carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP in 2020 compared to 2005 decreased by 40% -45 %. However, 
along with the rapid economic growth in China, energy consumption and carbon dioxide emission have 
increased sharply, China has become the world’s largest energy consumption. 
By estimating Environmental Kuznets Curve, Cai Fang et al. [1] predicted the turning point of emission  
from increase to decline, examined the induced need for the Chinese economy to implement emission 
reduction strategy , and proposed that energy conservation and emission reduction should  come from 
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internal  to find the motivation and incentive compatible strategy˗ Guo Ru et al. [2] presented a system 
analysis approach on carbon emission reduction at urban level, taking Shanghai as a case, proposed to 
promote energy saving and emission reduction work by improving  industrial structure, optimizing energy 
structure, strengthening carbon sink. Edward Vine and Jan Hamrin [3] illustrated their findings on the 
experience to date with ESCs, outlined potential program opportunities in the US, and concluded with 
their perspective on how to proceed with the use of ESCs, particularly as a component of GHG reduction 
programs. Peng Jiang-bo and Guo Qi [4] put forward that we should make use of market mechanism 
effectively in the promotion of energy conservation and emission reduction. In fact, financial policy 
support is urgent for the smooth progress of energy saving and emission reduction. However, to our best 
knowledge, there are few literatures research on credit policies deeply. 
In this respect, we mainly focus on the energy saving and emission reduction credit policies, shed light 
on the relations between financial institutions and enterprises  from the usage of loans, introduce variables 
such as positive and negative utility of enterprises’ reputation, utility of credit departments’ inspection, 
utility of enterprises’ public activities,  and analyze the optimal choices of enterprises and financial 
institutions under the condition of cooperation and noncooperation.  
2. Basic Hypothesis 
We first put forward some basic assumptions as follows˖ 
The game players are credit department of a financial institution and an enterprise applying for loans, 
both pursue max profit rationally. 
Enterprises apply to the credit departments for loans A which are used for the construction of new 
project and credit departments need to find whether the project meets the national emission reduction 
requirements; If  departments choose to inspect, they should pay the check cost C; If  departments find 
that enterprises conceal the fact of environmental assessment or provide false evidence, they would 
impose fines F on those enterprise. 
Due to energy demand soared, enterprises driven by benefit may apply new loans to high emission 
projects represented by backward productivity and technology, thus get maximum profit under low-cost, 
which would cause the backward productivity resurgent. They may also apply loans to low emission 
projects. If used to high emission projects, these loans may become non-performing ones because of 
many reasons such as the national policy limitation, regional environmental requirements and the 
reduction of the public’s evaluation to those enterprises. 
If new projects are high emission, the enterprises need to pay a negative reputation 1R , otherwise, they 
gain a positive reputation 2R ; If managers of credit departments choose to inspect, they get disutility; The 
managers’ behavior may be short-term, they take enterprises’ bribe and obtain utility M , so they choose 
not to inspect these loans and try to cover up disk. 
Parameters 1 2C F R R E M澤 澤 澤 澤 澤  are greater than zero, and suppose A F C E A M   !   . 
The payoff matrix of both sides is shown as Table 1( E=enterprises and B=credit departments). 
 
Table 1. Payoff matrix of credit departments and enterprises 
 
            B 
E 
Inspect Not Inspect 
High emission 1( , )F R A F C E      ( , )A A M   
Low  emission 2( , )R A C E   ( , )A A  
 
2456   Lu Mina and Cang Yu-quan /  Energy Procedia  75 ( 2015 )  2454 – 2459 
From Table 1, we can see that each player has two alternative strategies. That is to say , enterprises can 
choose high emission or not, meanwhile, the credit departments may also choose to inspect or not. If 
enterprises choose high emission, credit departments choose to inspect, and if enterprises choose low 
emission, credit departments choose not to inspect; if the credit departments choose to inspect, enterprises 
choose low emission, and if the credit departments choose not  to inspect, enterprises choose high 
emission. We find that these two players have obtained two pure strategies Nash equilibriums: (inspect, 
low emission) and (not inspect, high emission), which are all not good for energy saving and emission 
reduction. Next we will analyze the mix strategy Nash equilibrium of two sides.  
Credit departments and enterprises with a certain probability choose a course of action, constitute a mix 
strategy. We assume x  to be the probability the credit department inspect, and 1 x  corresponding to not 
inspect; We assume y  to be the probability enterprise choose high emission, and 1 y  corresponding to 
low emission. 
Based on these assumptions, we first give the optimal choices of enterprises and credit department 
from non-cooperative game ( 1 1( 1 )y y澤 ǃ 1 1( 1 )x x澤 ) and cooperative game ( 2 2( 1 )y y澤 ǃ 2 2( 1 )x x澤 ), 
then discuss those choices deeply. 
3. Credit Department and Enterprise Without Cooperation 
The expected return of enterprises and the credit departments can be expressed respectively as follows: 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1
( , ) ( ,1 ) =( 2 ) ( ) 2 (1)
1E
F R A x
U x y y y F R R A x y A R x Ay
R A x
 § ·§ ·        ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹© ¹
 
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( , ) ( ,1 ) = ( 2 ) ( ) ( 2 ) (2)
1B
yA F C E A M
U x y x x F M A x y C E x M A y A
yA C E A
     § ·§ ·         ¨ ¸¨ ¸  © ¹© ¹
 
 The first order conditions are:  
 
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1
1 1
( , ) ( , )
( 2 ) 2 0, ( 2 ) 0 (3)E B
U x y U x yF R R A x A F M A y C E
y x
w w             w w   
The solution of the equation (3) , 
 * *1 1
1 2
2 , (4)
2 2
A C Ex y
F A R R F A M
        
 
3.1.  Sensitive analysis to the probability ( *1x ) of credit departments 
 
* 2 *
1 1
2 2 3
1 2 1 2
2 40 , 0 (5)
( 2 ) ( 2 )
x xA A
F F R R A F F R R A
w w    !w    w     
* 2 * * 2 *
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 21 2
0 0, 0 0 (6)x x x x
R RR R
w w w w !  !w ww w澤 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We find that with the augment of  fines to the enterprises, negative reputation due to high emission and 
positive reputation due to low emission, the probability credit departments inspect will decrease 
correspondingly, and the probability is concave to F , 1R  and 2R , that is, if we want to bring down the 
probability ( *1x )  by increasing F , 1R  and 2R , the initial effects are significant but subsequently 
underpowered. 
3.2. Sensitive analysis to the probability ( *1y ) of  high emission 
Seeing from 
* 2 *
1 1
2 2 3
2( )0, 0
(2 ) (2 )
y yC E C E
F A F M F A F M
w w     !w   w   , in short time, the more fines 
credit department impose on high emission enterprises, the lower probability enterprises choose high 
emission, but effect is not obvious in the long run, therefore fines cannot serve as the only means of 
reducing high emission probability.  
We can also draw the conclusion from 
* 2 *
1 1
2 2 3
2( )0, 0
(2 ) (2 )
y yC E C E
M A F M M A F M
w w  !  !w   w   as follows, 
with the increase in credit departments’ utility due to enterprises’ public activities, the probability 
enterprises which choose high emission will increase too, meanwhile, *1y  is concave to M , indicating 
that enterprises’ public relations activities can lead to significant increase in high emissions probability, 
with serious negative externalities.  
* 2 * * 2 *
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 10, 0, 0, 0
2 2
y y y yand
C A F M E A F MC E
w w w w !   !  w   w  w w  mean that increase in credit 
department’s check cost and negative reputation will lead to the increase in high emission probability. 
Therefore, it is necessary that different sectors in the government should strengthen cooperation, enhance 
the credit departments’ availability of various types of information, decease the check cost as low as 
possible, consequently, reduce enterprises’ high emission probability.  
4. Credit Department and Enterprise With Cooperation 
Credit capital is a scarce resource. It’s harder for enterprises to gain loans because of the tilt of 
financial institutions’ credit policies. So enterprises and credit departments of financial institutions may 
plot together. 
We assume that enterprises and credit departments have the common expected return function just for 
simply analysis, 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ) (7)E BU x y U x y U x y 
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( ) ( ) (8)U x y M R R x y A R C E x My A         
  
The first order conditions are, 
 
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 1 2 2
2 2
( , ) ( , )
( ) ( ) 0 ( ) 0 (9)
U x y U x yM R R y A R C E M R R x M
x y
w w               w w澤
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Then we get * * 22 2
1 2 1 2
A R C EMx y
M R R M R R
       澤  from equation (9). 
4.1. Sensitive analysis to the probability ( *2x ) of credit departments 
* 2 *
2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 3
1 2 1 2
2( )0 0
( ) ( )
x R R x R R
M M R R M M R R
w  w  !   w   w  澤  show that with  the increase in utility due to 
enterprises’ public activities, the probability credit departments inspect will increase correspondingly, and 
the probability ( *2x )  is convex to M , which means that under the condition of cooperative game, credit 
departments would also increase inspective probability, therefore in some cases intensified inspection 
may be just the superficial phenomenon.  
In addition, 
 
* *2
1 2 1 22 1 2 2 1 2
3 2 4
1 2 1 21 1 2 1 1 2
0, 0, 24 2 2
( ) , ( ) (10)
0, 0, 2( ) ( )
R M R R M Rx M R R x M R R
R M R R M RR M MM R R R M R R
­ !    ­w   w   w w°    ® ®!   ! ! w w w  w  ° ¯¯
 
Obviously, when 21 RMR ! , M
x
w
w *2 is negatively correlated with enterprises’ negative reputation 
1R ,then, if  212 2 RMRRM  , M
x
w
w *2 is convex to 1R ;if 21 2 RMR ! , M
x
w
w *2 is concave to 1R . when 
21 RMR  , M
x
w
w *2 is positively correlated with enterprises’ negative reputation 1R , M
x
w
w *2 is concave to 1R . 
In other words, with fixed 2RMǃ and increasing reputation 1R , M
x
w
w *2  increase fist then decline, which 
means that blindly enlarging high emission enterprises negative reputation will cause credit departments’ 
lower inspective probability. 
And 
 
* 2 * * 2 *
2 2 2 2
2 2 3 2
1 21 2 1 1 2 2
20, 0, 0, 0 (11)
( ) ( )
x x x xM M
R RM R R R F R R R
w w w w    !  !w w  w   w
 
indicates that under the condition of conspire, enlarging the high emission enterprises’ negative reputation 
and low emission enterprises’ positive reputation can reduce the credit departments’ inspective 
probability.  
4.2.  Sensitive analysis to the probability ( *2y ) of  high emission 
Seeing from 
* 2 * * 2 *
2 2 2 22 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 21 1
0 0 0 0
= =
0 0 0 0
A R C E A R C E A R C E A R C Ey y y y
A R C E A R C E A R C E A R C EM RM R
!        !       ­ ­ ­ ­w w w w  ® ® ® ®  !  !  !    !  !  ! w ww w¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
澤 澤 澤
when ECRA  2 ˈincrease in M and 1R  leads to increase in high emission probability *2y , and *2y  
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is convex to M ǃ 1R ; when ECRA ! 2 , increase in M and 1R  leads to decrease in high emission 
probability *2y , and  
*
2y  is concave to M ǃ 1R , that is to say, if  we want to reduce the high emission 
probability, we should not only consider the enterprises’ positive reputation and credit departments’ 
utility due to pubic activities but the credit departments’ check cost. 
01
21
*
2
*
2  w
w w
w
RRME
y
C
y
 shows that to maximize the two players’ profit, enterprises may 
reduce the high emission probability when check cost and disutility increase.  
5. Conclusions 
Financial institutions should strengthen internal management, establish internal prevention and 
supervision mechanism , prevent the credit departments and enterprises conspiring and pursuing the 
maximum ego benefit by effective systems. Under the circumstance of conspiring, the probability of 
enterprises’ high emission will increase obviously, which can also damage financial institutions’ overall 
benefits and make the financial system more fragile. 
The positive publicity and guidance of public opinion to the low emission enterprises should be 
intensified. Establishing low emission enterprises’ green files, providing diversified credit supports 
including the circular credit mechanism and enlarging low emission enterprises’ reputation are also 
extremely significant. 
Reducing the probability of enterprises’ high emission and avoiding the backward productivity 
resurgent can not solely rely on increasing whitewashing cost of high emission projects or imposing more 
fines on enterprises that conceal the fact of environmental assessment. Related departments need to make 
full use of multi-pronged approaches, strengthen communication of information and policy coordination, 
further perfect the functional departments’ information exchange and sharing mechanism, then form a 
combined fist of different policies about energy conservation and emission reduction, and enhance 
resultant force of policies.  
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